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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MANDATORY RETIREMENT-A VEHICLE
FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION
"A man's ageing and his decline always takes place inside
some given society: it is intimately related to the character of that
society and to the place that the individual in question occupies
w-ithin it. '
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR
I. INTRODUCTION
In a society obsessed with youth and productivity, there is no place for
the older worker, as a result the condition of the elderly is a deplorable one.
2
Though the poor and minorities are the most heavily burdened, no class,
race, ethnic group, or sex are untouched by the pernicious effect of age dis-
crimination. The White House, cognizant of the elderly's plight, in a recent
position paper stated that:
['the] administration is deeply committed to involving older
citizens as actively as possible in the life of the nation, by enacting
their opportunities for both voluntary service and regular employ-
ment.
The President promised to send a directive to the heads of
all federal departments and agencies emphasizing the administra-
tion policy -that age should be no bar to a federal job when an
individual is otherwise qualified to fill it.3
In 1967, Congress also intended to relieve the elderly's desperate situation
by enacting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.4 Despite these of-
ficial pronouncements and the passage of -this legislation, pitifully little has
been done to resolve the predicament of the aged.5
Most people philosophically agree that discrimination based on race, re-
1. S. de BEAUVOIR, THE COMING OF AGE, 56 (1973).
2. The Aging in America, 10 TRIAL 11 (Mar./Apr. 1974).
3. Beckman, Nixon Plan for Elderly Is Outlined, Chicago Tribune, March 24,
1972, sec. 2, at 12, col. 1.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967). It should be noted that "on a percentage basis mi-
norities are actually less affected" than other groups. Letter from Martin Hochbaum,
urbanologist, American Jewish Congress, to author, May 10, 1974; See also, Some Dem-
ographic Aspects of Aging in the United States, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, series P-23, No. 43, (Feb. 1973).
5. See infra discussion.
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ligion, or sex is invidious. Unfortunately, discrimination against the elderly
enjoys widespread social approval.6
There is a problem that is faced by the elderly that is not faced by
any other minority segment in society. That problem is mandatory retire-
ment. This article will attempt to analyze the negative effects of mandatory
retirement, the role of organized labor in aiding the older worker, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act 7 and the individual's recourse in protect-
ing himself through litigation. Perhaps through this analysis more viable
remedies can be developed for providing work opportunitites for the capable
elderly. These work opportunities should not be the result of arbitrary de-
terminations based on age alone, but they should be ,founded on recent
scientific and sociological data. Judges, legislatures, attorneys and unions
must recognize and implement this research in order to effectively protect
mature persons from arbitrary discrimination in employment. The following
section analyzes the scientific and sociological data.
I. MANDATORY RETIREMENT
There are three differing philosophies regarding retirement. The first
philosophy views retirement as a time for increased leisure, a welcome
escape from the work filled years of the past." Voluntary retirement on an
adequate income can 'be a highly satisfying experience. It affords freedom
from pressure and opportunities for creativity. Conversely, the second
philosophy adheres to a theory that employment is the most important role
an individual undertakes; therefore, one should work as long as he can.9
According to this school of thought, a person's value is dependent upon his
skill and productivity. 10 A third philosophy is the middle position which
advocates that the older worker be "slowly phased out of the work role"
through part-time employment." In addition, he should be offered paid
employment in the retirement period.' 2  This philosophy recognizes the fact
that some older persons must continue working because Social Security and
welfare benefits are inadequate.
The focus of this article will be on the estimated 34 per cent' 3 of the
6. Porter, The Toughest Form of Job Discrimination . . ., Chicago Sun-Times,
Nov. 18, 1973, at 103, col. 1; see also 28 U.N. GAOR 37 (Aug. 28, 1973).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ADEA].
8. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING, RETIREMENT ROLES AND ACTIVITIES,
(1971) [hereinafter cited as WHITE HousE CONFERENCE].
9. id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 11.
12. Id.
13. Note, Too Old to Work: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Retirement
Plans, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 150, 162 (1971). Brief For Appellant at 25 n.18, Weisbrod
v. Lynn, No. 73-1146 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It should be noted that it is difficult to esti-
mate the number with accuracy. See also Abbott, Covered Employment and the Age
Men Claim Retirement Benefits, 37 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN at 3 (Apr. 1974).
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elderly who have both the ability and the desire to continue working. These
capable elderly are arbitrarily discriminated against, "contrary to the prin-
ciple of equal employment opportunities.' 4  This article does not address
itself to those who voluntarily choose to retire, to those who can continue
in the work force because of self employment, or to those whose particular
occupations do not require their retirement., 5
A. Myths That Support Mandatory Retirement
Research has indicated that the nine most frequently cited reasons justi-
fying mandatory retirement fall into two categories: the disabilities of the
aged and administrative problems created by their continued employment. 16
Objections based on disability state that the elderly: 1. are less efficient;
therefore, unable to maintain production standards; 2. experience an intel-
lectual decline in old age; 17 3. show a decrease in stamina and strength
which causes an inability to comply with employer safety requirements; 4.
cannot adjust to new work situations, new company policies and practices
due to inflexibility; and 5. contract frequent illnesses resulting in absences
from work.' 8
The administrative objections most often cited by employers include:
1. increased corporate insurance costs; 2. difficulty and costliness of admin-
istering "a selective retirement system on an individual basis"; 19 3. discour-
agement of new blood in the company; 4. fear that promotion openings
would be hampered without mandatory retirement. 20  These premises are
untenable in light of the facts.
Numerous studies have revealed that one's birth year is an irrelevant
factor in determining capability. 2' "(P)erformance of middled-aged and
older persons is at least equal to and often-times noticeably better than
14. The National Council on the Aging, INDUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY 17 at 81
(Spring 1973).
15. See Brief For Appellant, Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D. N.Y. 1971);
aff'd without opinion, Nos. 71-1398, 71-1852 (2d Cir. 1972), addendum and Brief For
Appellant, Weisbrod v. Romney, No. 73-1146 (D.C. Cir. 1974) addendum. These ad-
denda list famous individual's accomplishments past age 69. Some of the persons in-
cluded are Mies van der Rohe, Frank Lloyd Wright, Michelangelo, Picasso, Bernard
Baruch, James Bryant Conant, Robert Frost, David Ben Gurion, Golda Meir, Benjamin
Franklin, Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas, Pablo Casals, Toscanini, Imman-
uel Kant and many more.
16. S. CAL. L. REv. supra note 13.
17. Baltes and Schaie, The Myth of the Twilight Years, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, 35
(Mar. 1974).
18. See note 16 supra.
19. Id. at 158.
20. Id. at 159.
21. Id.; WHITE HousE CONFERENCE ON AGING, EMPLOYMENT AND RETIREMENT,(1971) [hereinafter cited as WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON RETIREMENT]: U.S. DEPT.
OF LABOR, THE LAW AGAINST AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 1303 (Sept.
1970); see also note 14 supra.
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younger workers."'2 2 Because of the elderly's increased cautiousness and
consciousness of safety regulations, they are less likely to cause accidents. 23
This is true despite the fact that older workers' reflexes are not as quick
as their youthful counterparts. 24 Adjustments to new situations can be made
by the elderly,2 5 particularly where their economic condition necessitates it.
Recent research suggests that intellectual capacity of the elderly has not
been properly measured by intelligence tests. 26  The score variations among
age groups is due to the educational differences of each generation. Older
people have had less formal education than younger people and their edu-
cation relied more on memorization than problem solving.27 Different gen-
erations also vary in their sophistication in taking tests. They also "differ
in the extent to which they have -been encouraged" 28 in intellectual achieve-
ment. Another reason for score variation is that the intelligence concepts
and the measurement instruments used "are defined in terms of abilities
most important during youth and early adulthood. '29 Prediction of school
performance was the original purpose of intelligence tests thus "tests de-
veloped to measure the abilities of one generation may be invalid for an-
other."30
The administrative objections advanced by employers in favor of man-
datory retirement also lack substance. Higher insurance costs alone is not
an adequate justification for discrimination against the elderly. 31  Instead
22. Developments in Aging: 1972 and January-March 1973, A Report of the
Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., at 72 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Report On Aging].
23. See note 16 supra at 161.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, note 17 supra at 36.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 37.
30. Id. at 36.
31. Because actuarial statistics favor the young, insurance rates also favor the
young, but this is not the entire picture. Insurance costs should be a very incidental
reason in an employer's removal of an employee. The cost factor is dependent upon
the number of years the worker is employed, thus a new 25 year old worker can cost
the company the same amount as the present 65 year old if the latter came to work for
the company at age 25 also.
The cost of life insurance only becomes prohibitive to the employer when there
is a lack of a pension program, a majority of the workers are over 65, the program does
not have a cut back feature or reduction formula and the employer is locked into the
situation because of a union negotiated contract. But in practice this is very rare and
only 1% of group plan operations fall within this costly dilemma.
There are three types of coverage provided by employers: group life insurance,
health insurance and disability insurance and it can be demonstrated that in the majority
of cases, the insurance costs for retaining the over 65 year old are not so great. Most
group life insurance is reduced by 50% at age 65 thereby resulting in a cost savings
device to the employer and the employee. The reason for this reduction is that the need
for life insurance is considerably reduced' at 65. Even a 50 year old man does not gen-
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the cost of administering a selective retirement system would be offset by
the savings gained by retaining skilled, experienced employees and eliminat-
ing the costs of retraining new workers. 32  Generally, the percentage of older
workers wishing to be retained in any one company would not be so great
as to hamper promotions or discourage "new blood."33  The older workers
provide a stabilizing influence in a plant because they are not likely to seek
new employment and are usually more loyal to their employers than younger
employees .3
Medical and behavioral science studies have demonstrated the sound-
ness of the concept of functional age rather than chronological age as the
test for employability. However industry, commerce, unions and govern-
ment agencies have not relied on these studies.3 5  Instead they have relied
;upon a myth of the stereotyped inability of 'the elderly rather than "a rational
assessment of individual capabilities or needs."'36 It is important to examine
the pervasive effects of stereotyping the elderly on their economic, psycho-
logical and physical wellbeing.
B. Economic, Psychological, and Physical
Consequences of Mandatory Retirement37
Proponents of compulsory retirement tend to make unreasonable eco-
nomic assumptions since retirement does not bring the pleasure of leisure
when one is forced to live on a poverty level. "For most Americans, depar-
ture from the labor force brings a substantial decrease in income. 38  Even
workers with retirement pension funds find these funds to be inadequate,
erally need as much insurance because his children are older, thus reducing the need to
provide for them and their education in case of death. Hence by reducing life insur-
ance the older worker can be retained without financial harm to the employer.
Health and disability insurance are no major problems to the employer. The gov-
ernment has insured the older worker through medicare coverage; therefore, health
insurance coverage costs reduce automatically at age 65. Many employers do not have
disability insurance but for those that do, retaining 65 year old employees should not be
an added cost to the employer because the benefits usually cease at age 65. Interview
with Edward P. Phelan, Regional Manager of Guardian Life Insurance Company, in
Chicago, Illinois, Mar. 6, 1974. General insurance information obtained from inter-
view with Donald R. Dann, noted author and lecturer in the insurance field, Dann
Brothers Inc. in Chicago, Illinois, Mar. 7, 1974.
32. S. CAL. L. REV., supra note 16.
33. Id. at 163.
34. id.
35. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, supra note 21.
36. S. CAL. L. REV., supra note 32, at 152.
37. See generally L.J. BESC-OF, ADULT PSYCHOLOGY (1969); V.M. BRANTL,
READINGS IN GERONTOLOGY (1973); and C. TIBirrs, HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL GERON-
TOLOGY, (1970).
38. Developments in Aging, 1969, A Report of the Special Committee on Aging,
United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess. (1970), at 146 [hereinafter cited as 1969
Report on Aging]; see also Reno, Compulsory Retirement Among Newly Entitled
Workers, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, No. 7, Mar. 1972, at 11.
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The income from 'the pension fund does not coincide with increased costs
of living and purchasing power declines A9 Due to age discrimination and
various restrictions of employment while on a pension, many needy elderly
are unable to obtain another job in order to supplement their income. 40
These problems, coupled with increased longevity, contribute to the eco-
nomic difficulties of the elderly. Life savings, earmarked for retirement, may
no longer be sufficient to supplement the individual's income.
The elderly comprise a substantial percentage of our nation's poor.4'
Taking cognizance of the economic realities of the elderly, the legislature
has increased the Social Security 'benefits.4 2 However Social Security
still provides insufficient funds and it has many inequities. The limit on
the earned income for the purpose of the retirement test penalizes the el-
derly with no other income source. They must earn money in order to exist.
Another inequity results for those who are 'forced to retire early because
they receive decreased Social Security benefits and usually, these people are
-the ones who can least afford it.43 Conversely those individuals that are able
to continue to 'work past age sixty-five are not discriminated against by the
Social Security Act. A "late retirement credit and a substitution of recent
high earnings for lower past earnings in benefit calculations tend to increase
'benefits -for people who are willing, able and permitted to work 'beyond typi-
cal retirement age." 44
Not only is work economically important, it is psychologically a source
of recognition in our society. The work ethic is tied in with 'being a re-
spected member of the community. "[S]tudies have shown that morale and
life satisfaction of employed persons are greater than in retired persons of
similar health and socioeconomic status."' 45  Mandatory retirement is an-
other way for society to say that the older person is useless because society
no longer needs his productivity.4"
The American Medical Association Council on Aging disclosed that the
denial of opportunity to work can threaten an individual's health. 47
39. S. CAL. L. REV., supra note 36.
40. Davis, Pension Provisions Affecting the Employment of Older Workers,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Apr. 1973).
41. Legal Problems Affecting Older Americans, A Working Paper Prepared for
the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess., at 1 (1970).
Poverty has been cited as a breeder of mental illness in the aged. "It can cause mal-
nutrition and anemia that directly result in brain syndrome which, often unrecognized,
becomes fixed." R.N. BUTLER, M.I. LEwis, AGING AND MENTAL HEALTH, at 272
(1973).
42. Bloom, Public Policy Report, 2 PERSPECTIVE ON AGING, No. 4, (Aug., 1973).
43. The Aging Worker and the Union, AFL-CIO, at 21.
44. Letter from Virginia Reno, Social Security Administration, Office of Research
and Statistics, to author, Sept. 13, 1973.
45. INDUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY, supra note 14 at 81.
46. S. CAL. L. REV. supra note 39.
47. Id.
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"[T]here is a growing body of knowledge which suggests that a major rea-
son for the health problems exhibited by unemployed older individuals is
related to damaging employment experiences in previous years."'48 Dr. Sid-
ney Cobb49 examined the impact of a plant closing on -the physical and
mental health of the workers. The study concluded that a loss of "a job
can exacerbate diseases and even produce new illnesses", 50 thus indicating
that idleness, rather than the aging process alone, may actually cause physi-
cal deterioration.
Despite these findings, generalizations must be avoided because eco-
nomic conditions of employment, nature of the work, personality and gen-
eral health factors may affect an individual's ability to continue in employ-
ment. A retirement study by G. F. Streib and C. J. Schneider 5' found that
people " 'of higher income levels, higher educational attainments and higher
occupational structure tend to work 'longer than their counterparts with lower
socioeconomic status.' "52 In juxtaposition, those groups employed in tedious
assembly line or heavy labor type jobs cannot retire fast enough. 53  As a
result of their retirement, their health improved rather than declined. These
findings illustrate "how difficult it is to generalize from either -the clinical
or the social science perspective." 54
The relegation of the elderly to a single role should not be permitted.
They are individuals with different values, capacities, personalities and life
styles. 55  A person's worth should be measured by his individual capacity,
unique to each human being, rather than the number of years he happens
to be on earth. 56  "Compulsory retirement is unfair to the capable older
worker, psychologically and socially damaging and economically wasteful '57
to the individual and the country.58
48. 1969 Report on Aging, supra note 38, at 115.
49. He is with the institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan.
50. 1969 Report on Aging, supra note 48, at 115.
51. G.F. STREIB, C.J. SCHNEIDER, RETIREMENT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, (1971).
52. AGING AND MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 41, at 264.
53. Smedley, Patterns of Early Retirement, THE AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST (Jan.
1974) has a comprehensive discussion on the problems of early retirement. Interview
with Carl Shier, International Representative with the United Auto Workers, in Chi-
cago, Illinois, Mar. 20, 1974.
54. AGING AND MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 41 at 264; see also, letter from Mor-
ton A. Lieberman, Professor of Psychiatry at University of Wisconsin Medical School,
to author, Mar. 21, 1974.
55. WHITE HousE CONFERENCE, supra note 8.
56. Improving the Age Discrimination Law, A Working Paper, prepared for use
by the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., at 35,
(Sept., 1973) [hereinafter cited as Improving ADEA].
57. INDUSTRIAL GEREONTOLOGY supra note 14, at 82.
58. 1969 Report on Aging, supra, note 50. The cost of retirement to the govern-
ment is enormous. In 1968 25 billion dollars was paid out through Social Security and
2.1 billion dollars to federal civil service retirees. AGING AND MENTAL HEALTH, supra
note 41 at 270.
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III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-A MEANS TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC
SECURITY OF THE ELDERLY5 9
A. Nature of Collective Bargaining
Organized labor is one means of improving -the elderlys' economic posi-
tion -because collective bargaining is the principal method for determining
wages, hours and other conditions of employment for those who work for
others.60 Numerous decisions and awards have frequently sustained com-
pulsory retirement as a proper subject for collective bargaining. 61  It has
been held 'to be in the same category "as the right to bargain and contract
for wages, seniority, and discharge of employees .... -62 Retirement age
is bargainable because it affects a condition of employment, 'the right to
work.63 However, the increase of 'benefits for persons retired has been held
not to be a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The Supreme Court,
in N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburg Plate Glass,64 reasoned that as the individuals were
no longer employees there is no duty to bargain for them. Therefore, the
worker must be presently employed and under contract in order to receive
any benefits relating to retirement. However, the recent contract negotia-
tions between Basic Steel and United Steelworkers of America has resulted
in an escalator provision in their new pension plan. 61 This additional pay-
ment added to retirees monthly pension amount will reflect -the rising living
costs and will enable older retired workers to cope with the rapid escalation
in prices. This advantageous provision is an outstanding example of the
manner in which collective bargaining can insure the economic security of
older workers.
In order to participate in collective bargaining, employees choose,
through a majority vote, a bargaining representative.66  The employees are
then -bound by the agreement their representative and the company negoti-
ate.6 7 Collective bargaining agreements only include agreed upon employ-
59. See generally Serwer, Mandatory Retirement At Age 65-A Survey of the
Law, INDUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY 11 (Winter 1974).
60. Honeggers, 71-1 CCH ARB 8214 (Feb. 4, 1971). See generally DANEY,
CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1959).
61. McMullans v. Kan., Okla., and Gulf Ry. Co., 229 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1956);
Ricks v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 184 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Va., 1960), Lamon v.
G. So. and Fla. Ry. 212 Ga. 63, 90 S.E. 2d 658 (1955); Pacific Coast Container Corp.
72-1 CCH ARB. 8016 (1972); Ingersoll-Rand Co., 42 LA 483 (1964) (Scheiber,
Arbitrator); T.W.A. Inc. 31 LA 45 (1958) (Platt, Arbitrator).
62. McMullans v. Kan., Okla., and Gulf Ry. Co., 229 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1956)
at 55.
63. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 42 LA 483 (1964) (Scheiber, Arbitrator).
64. N.L.R.B. v. Pa. Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
65. Interview with Sam Evett, Director of District 31 of the United Steel-
workers of America, in Chicago, Illinois, Apr. 16, 1974.
66. McMullans and Lamon, supra note 61.
67. Id.; Flowers v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen and Eng'rs, 212 Ga. 142, 91 S.E.
2d 41 (1956) at 43 holds that "no employee, a member of the class represented by the
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ment rights. 68  But these agreements can provide for revisions and abroga-
tions by future valid amendments;69 -therefore, they do not give permanent
status to seniority rights.7 0 Seniority rights are threatened by mandatory re-
tirement. Consequently, in situations where individuals are forced to retire,
disputes as to the distinctions between discharge and retirement often arise. 71
B. Arbitration
1. Discharge versus Retirement Disputes
Despite numerous rulings that have held age alone is not just cause
for discharge, United States Steel Corporation v. Nichols clarified the distinc-
tion between discharge and retirement:
In the absence of an established, bona fide, uniform retirement
plan, the company could not 'discharge' an employee without
cause 'by the simple expedient of saying that the employee had
been -retired, and in that manner avoid the consequences of break-
ing a contract which prohibits discharges except for cause.' 72
This distinction has been further explicated through arbitration.
Arbitration results when there are disputes as to the meaning of the
collective 'bargaining agreement. 73 There is no stare decisis in arbitration
awards; therefore, they are decided on the facts and circumstances in each
case.74  A review of arbitration cases can, nonetheless, give a general idea
as to the manner in which grievances involving mandatory retirement are
being handled.75
bargaining agent, would have a right to negotiate independently a contract of employ-
ment with the railroad."
68. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1956) held that although
the union justifiably disagreed with the forced retirement policy of the company, the
company had a common law right to exercise that policy until the union and company
would agree.
69. Lamon, supra note 61.
70. Id.; the union is under no duty to inform their members of any changes in the
contract, Ricks v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., supra note 61.
71. Brickles, Inc., 65-2 CCH ARB 1 8700 (1965) (Bell, Arbitrator).
72. See supra note 68 at 403.
73. The courts have jurisdiction of these disputes only when there is a dispute as
to the agreement's validity, Lamon, supra note 69; or when there is a question as to
their arbitrability, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963)
and American Stores Co. v. Johnston, 171 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); or when the
company is unwilling to comply with the grievance procedure, United Protective Work-
ers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir., 1952). Gunther v. San
Diego and Ariz., E. Ry. Co., 382 U.S. 257 (1965) stated unequivocally that the power
to interpret railroad union collective bargaining agreements and to arbitrate forced re-
tirement grievances rests in the Railway Adjustment Board rather than the courts.
74. Armour Agricultural Chem. Co., 47 LA 513 (1966) (Larkin, Arbitrator).
75. Arbitrators interpret the contract. Even where the contract has expired, the
arbitrator has ascertained that the old contract is in effect. Hale Bros., 32 LA 713(1959) (Ross, Arbitrator).
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In arbitrations involving forced retirement issues, the union usually
argues that the employee was discharged without just cause where the con-
tract does not specifically delineate a mandatory retirement policy. 76 The
company contends that the employee has not been discharged but has been
terminated for cause because there is an age limitation.77 Arbitrators have
tried to define the difference between discharge and retirement. Discharge
has been distinguished as being unilateral, while retiremnt connotes some
bilateral -action. Though retirement needs the -tacit consent of the employee,
the end result of retirement is the same as discharge-termination of em-
ployment. 78 Thus, a person is "deprived of an opportunity to exchange his
skills and energies with his employer for monetary payments[.] ' 79
In order for the unions to avoid unjustified termination of employment
for their members, they must appreciate what is required to circumvent a
valid mandatory retirement policy. A review of forced retirement disputes
can be helpful for an understanding of one method used by organized labor
in protecting their workers' seniority rights.
2. Mandatory Retirement Plans Require Union and Company Agreement
Arbitrators have invalidated compulsory retirement where there has
been no printed mandatory retirement plan in evidence.80 A company can-
not claim that they have consistently maintained a mandatory retirement
policy unless they reveal documents to establish such a plan. Only -the par-
ties involved in the collective bargaining, not the arbitrator, can change an
agreement through future negotiations.8 '
Arbitrators have not allowed companies to unilaterally draft forced re-
tirement provisions which would terminate physically able and competent
employees. For the company to do so would be a violation of the workers'
security and seniority rights as set forth in the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 2 Arbitrators have found that unilateral decisions by management to
discharge capable workers due to age is discriminatory when it is not consist-
ent with any pension plan, when there is no specified retirement age in the
contract and when there is no established past practice of forced retirementa 3
76. Brickles supra, note 71.
77. Beatrice Foods, Ind. Moulding and Frame Co., 71-1 CCH ARB. 8073
(1970). (Young, Arbitrator).
78. Brickles supra note 76.
79. Beatrice supra note 77 at 3264.
80. Beatrice supra, note 77; and Grancolombiana, Inc., 42 LA 559 (1964) (Al-
tieri, Arbitrator). The courts also have invalidated mandatory retirement where the
contract has no provision for mandatory retirement because age alone is an insufficent
cause for discharge. United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194
F.2d 997 (7th Cir., 1952).
81. Beatrice supra note 80.
82. Armour supra note 74; Grancolombiana supra note 80.
83. Grancolombiana supra note 82.
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Companies have argued that they may exercise this unilateral right of
mandatory retirement because: 1. it is their right to manage their business;
2. it is an accepted practice in industry; 4 3. it is not unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious since all employees must retire at sixty-five;8 5 4. it is necessary
to insure jobs for younger workers in economically depressed areas;86 5. it
is a permissible policy so long as it is not a subterfuge to accomplish a d-is-
charge;87 and 6. it is an enforcible policy regardless of previous practice.s'8
The union rebuttal to these company assertions is that the bargaining table
is the proper place to discuss mandatory retirement8 9
Compulsory retirement requires the tacit consent of the union because
it is a change in the employee's working conditions; therefore, the union
must have notice of the plan and must have acquiesced to it. In Trans
World Airlines, Inc. and International Association of Machinists the union
had a history of vigorously protesting compulsory retirement every time they
were confronted with the threat. The arbitrator ,held that the company can-
not unilaterally
introduce a compulsory retirement policy and hence a new condi-
tion for loss of seniority without giving prior notice to ,the Union
of the intended change in the agreement and without bargaining
collectively thereon. (Footnote omitted).*°0
The reason for this position by the arbitrators is that it is the union's obli-
gation to protect their workers against any arbitrary actions of management,
especially where these actions jeopardize the seniority rights and the job
security of union members.91
A company that has never asserted its forced retirement perogative has
not been allowed to do so without the union's approval.9 2  The arbitrator
in Ingersoll-Rand Company reasoned that the union was lulled into a false
sense of security; consequently, the company was found to have waived its
option to enforce mandatory retirement.9 3  Notice to the union and the
acquiescence to the forced retirement provision by the union appear to be
mandatory.9 4
84. Brickles supra note 78.
85. Cook and Brown Lime Co., 68-2 CCH ARB. 8473 (1968) (Rice, Arbi-
trator); Beatrice supra note 81.
86. Brickles supra note 84.
87. Beatrice supra note 85.
88. Ingersoll supra note 61.
89. Beatrice supra note 85; Grancolombiana supra note 83; Hercules Powder Co.,
37 LA 771 (1961) (Jones, Arbitrator).
90. 31 LA 45 at 51 (1958) (Platt, Arbitrator).
91. Hale Bros. supra note 75.
92. Supra note 61.
93. Ingersoll supra note 63.
94. Hale supra note 75; Hercules supra note 89.
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3. Interpretation of the Agreement
The interpretation of the agreement is at the core of the arbitration
proceedings and the contract provisions are interpreted as a whole.95 Arbi-
trators will focus on contract provisions that expressly or impliedly prohibit
age discrimination. For an employer to curtail seniority rights, the provision
under which he acts must be clearly stated. If the agreement is silent on
the issue of compulsory retirement, the company is unable to retire an em-
ployee mentally and physically capable. 96
In the T.W.A. dispute the arbitrator focused on the contract clause that
stated:
Employees who have grown old in the service of the Company
and become unable to follow their regular work to advantage shall
be given preference of such light work as they are able to handle
in their work classification. 97
The arbitrator interpreted this provision to establish a policy of continuing
workers in employment regardless of age, for as long as they can work com-
petently.
A dispute involving Armour Agricultural Chemical Company further
exemplified the manner in which arbitrators have construed a contract provi-
sion in favor of the elderly worker. The clause allowed for employee pen-
sions for those "who shall have attained the age of sixty-five, and . . . shall
cease active service" and it "permits, but does not require retirement
.... ,"98 The arbitrator interpreted this clause using the word "permit" as
substantiating a flexible retirement policy. He further concluded that age
discrimination is contrary to public policy and he cited an Executive Order
of President Johnson:
[D]iscrimination in employment because of age, except upon the
basis of a bona fide occupational qualification . . .is inconsistent
with that principle and with the social and economic objectives of
our society. .... 9
Another contract provision that was interpreted to provide economic
security for the elderly was found in the Beatrice Foods arbitration. The
clause said:
'The Company will not discriminate in respect to hire, tenure of
employment against any employee . . . . The provisions of this
Agreement shall apply to all employees covered by this Agreement
without discrimination on account of race, color, national origin,
sex, AGE, or creed.' (Emphasis added).100
95. Ford supra note 80; T.W.A. supra note 61.
96. Armour supra note 74; Ingersoll supra note 73; Honnegers supra note 60.
97. T.W.A. supra note 61, at 51.
98. Armour supra note 82, at 513.
99. Id. at 518.
100. Supra note 77, at 3264.
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Regardless of contract provisions, the arbitrator also analyzes the past
practices of the employer. Where there is no past practice of enforcing re-
tirement at a specified age, the findings are usually for the union.1' 1 In
order for past practice to become part of a labor agreement, the practice
must be well known, of long duration and mutually agreed upon by the com-
pany and the union. 102
In contradistinction to the majority of arbitration awards two recent
arbitrators found in favor of the elderly despite incapability and frequent
absences. They required the company to reinstate the older workers after
their forced retirement. In the Pacific Coast Container Corporation contro-
versy, a man was retained by the company for three years despite his in-
capability. The arbitration award protected the older worker and held that
the company could not unilaterally decide upon forced retirement. 10 3 In the
other case the company forced early retirement because of the numerous
absences of -the worker. Although these absences were a result of a history
of chronic illnesses, the union presented the medical diagnosis which found
the employee capable and ready for continued work. The arbitrator found
that the employer had a duty to warn the employee before termination. 10 4
Thus arbitration awards have protected older workers when they were forced
to retire because of health and also where their jobs have been terminated
due to plant closures.' 0 5
In juxtaposition to the above awards, some arbitrators have held that
compulsory retirement at sixty-five is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-
cious because many retirement plans and the Social Security Act coincides
with this age. Since Social Security benefits are available to them, retire-
ment is justified because jobs must be made available to the younger
worker.' 0 6
Despite the questionable merit of the above opinion, mandatory retire-
ment has been held to be valid only where there has been a long established
policy, fairly and consistently enforced 'by the company. The union must
have knowledge of -the forced retirement policy and they must have acqui-
esced -to it. 107
101. American Stores and Ford supra note 73.
102. Honningers supra note 60.
103. Pacific supra note 61.
104. Gen. Tel. Co. of Calif., 72-2 CCH ARB. 1 8461 (1972). (Eaton, Arbitra-
tor).
105. In the Matter of Arbitration Between UAW, Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Works and Ex-Cell-O Cor. Case no. 5430071172 (1973) (Sembower, Arbi-
trator); and Bower Roller Bearing Division of UAW, Grievance No. D1828 (1973)
(Cole, Arbitrator), preferential transfers were ordered here.
106. Brickles supra note 71; Cook supra note 85.
107. U.S. Steel Corp. supra note 68; American Stores and Food supra note 73;
Brickles supra 71; Cook supra note 85; Hercules supra note 89.
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For a union to prevent age discrimination through forced retirement
it should attempt to:
1. negotiate mandatory retirement out of any contract during collec-
tive bargaining if there is not an adequate pension plan; and
2. negotiate for flexible retirement during the bargaining procedure;
and
3. protest any practice of involuntary retirement so that it cannot sub-
sequently be construed as acquiescence to that policy.
The unions have been active in lobbying for better economic protection
for the elderly through social legislation. They have 'accomplished much
through collective bargaining.108  Yet this response from organized labor has
not been sufficient to combat discrimination against the elderly worker. The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act'0 9 was specifically instituted to im-
prove the sad condition of the elderly. An analysis of the Federal Act, state
age discrimination acts and cases is essential to determine whether this legis-
lation is accomplishing its noble purpose.
IV. LEGISLATION REGARDING AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Forced retirement is essentially a question of age discrimination. 110
Age discrimination bills were introduced in the Congress in the 1950's; how-
ever, no action was taken until the 1964 Executive Order 11141 made it
public policy to ban age discrimination in employment under federal con-
tracts. After investigation the Secretary of Labor concluded that age dis-
crimination resulted in serious consequences to the economy and the indi-
vidual.1 ' In 1967 Congress finally acted to bar age bias by passing the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,'1 2 which "prohibits discrimination
in employment because of age in hiring, job retention, compensation, promo-
tions, and other conditions and privileges of employment. '"1 3 The ADEA
has been interpreted to deal with discharge practices, as well as hiring prac-
tices.114
The purpose of the Act is exemplary. It declares that:
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older
workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain
108. The Aging Worker and the Union, supra note 43.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 634 (1967). [Hereinafter cited either as Act or EDEA].
110. Letter from Rudolph T. Danstedt, Assistant to the President of National
Council of Senior Citizens, Inc. to author, Oct. 12, 1973.
111. Improving ADEA, supra note 56.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1967).
113. Improving ADEA supra note 56.
114. See Hodgson v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn.,
1971).
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employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced
from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for
job performance has become a common practice, and certain
otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of
older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially longterm un-
employment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and
employer acceptability is, relative to the younger 'ages, high among
older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their
employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce
and the free flow of goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to
help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems aris-
ing from the impact of age on employment." 15
The ADEA must be studied as -a whole in order to ascertain whether its
purpose has been or can be effectuated.
1. Substantive Problems in the ADEA
The principle defect in the ADEA is that only those persons between
forty and sixty-five are protected."16 Consequently, persons under forty and
over sixty-five can be discriminated against. The use of age sixty-five as
the upward limit is arbitrary because it does not allow for individual differ-
ences.
In addition to the restricted age coverage, the definition of employer
had been a limitation in the Act. Employer was defined as "a person en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty-five or more
employees. '""7  With federal and state government employees being ex-
empted as well, a vast number of persons were not covered by the ADEA.
However the 1974 amendments to the ADEA include within the scope of
the Act those industries with twenty employees or more and government
employees. 118 The ADEA prohibits employers, employment agencies and
labor organizations from advertising or indicating a preference as to age." 19
A recent case interpreted this clause broadly. A suit was brought against
115. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967).
116. Id. at § 631.
117. Id. at § 630 (b).
118. Conference Report on and Text of Minimum Wage Bill (S. 2747) G-6 (No.
60) 3-27-74; Chicago Daily News, Apr. 8, 1974 at 12, col. 1. Nixon signed the bill
amending the ADEA. The amendments also increased the monetary authorization
from 3 million to 5 million.
119. 20 U.S.C. 623 (e) (1967).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
an employment agency that advertised for "college students" and "recent
college graduates." The court did not find this a violation of the Act as
its intent was to alleviate the economic and psychological suffering of those
between forty and sixty-five, not to prevent younger people from getting
started in employment.1 20
Certain situations are excepted from the protection of the ADEA.
"[W]here age is a bona fide occupational qualification that is reasonably
necessary in normal operations of the particular business, or where the dif-
ferentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age," 121 there is no
age discrimination. There are two categories under this section. The first
category deals with federal statutory requirements that provide for compul-
sory retirement before a specified age "in order to secure the safety and
convenience of the public."' 22 The retirement of airline pilots at age sixty
has fallen within this exception.' 23 The mandatory retirement of policemen
at age sixty was also upheld in Mcllvaine v. Pennsylvania State Police. The
Pennsylvania court found that even if the ADEA was applicable, it would
be within the bona fide occupational qualification because physical vigor and
alertness needed for this job could only be provided by younger men. The
court also felt older men are more cautious to danger, while younger men
are likely to disregard danger thus they are better qualified to be police-
men.'
24
In juxtaposition to these interpretations of the bona fide occupational
qualifications provision of the ADEA is the 1973 case of Hodgson v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc. An Illinois Federal District Court found that the com-
pany's refusal to consider employment applicants between forty and sixty-
five was not a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of its business. Judge Parsons declared:
[s]afety is the foremost concern involved herein not only for de-
fendant but for plaintiff and this Court as well, but I cannot ac-
cept the contention that persons over 40 cannot become safe bus
drivers. I believe strongly that functional capacity and not
chronological age ought to be the most important factor as to
whether or not an individual can do a job safely. This determina-
tion must be made repeatedly throughout the employee's employ-
ment experience. The human variances involved are myriad;
there is no way to generalize as to the physical capability and phy-
120. Brennan v. Paragon Employment Agency, 356 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
aft'd without opinion, No. 73-1811, (Jan. 10, 1974). New York Times, Jan. 20, 1974,
sec. 1, at 2, Col. 1.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f) (1) (1967).
122. Age Discrimination in Employment under Federal Law, 9 GA. BAR. J. 114,
124 (1972); see also note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: A
Practical Application, 24 BAY L. REV. 601 (1972).
123. Airlines Pilots Asso. v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960).
124. 6 Pa. Cmwlth 505, 296 A.2d 630 (1972), affd 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801
(1973), cert. denied 42 U.S.L.W. 3540-41.
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siological makeup of an individual. Nor is there a way to project
how an individual will be affected 'by the aging process.1 25
However, this decision has been recently reversed by a three judge court
on the theory that Greyhound's concern ,with the well-being and safety of their
passengers is sufficient to justify its hiring 'age policy.
The second category of bona fide occupational qualifications encom-
passes special occupational circumstances. Actors and persons hired to ad-
vertise and promote the sale of products to a particular group are ex-
empted. 126
Another exception to the ADEA is that the age determination must be
part of bona fide seniority system or benefit plan;1 27 it must not be a sub-
terfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. 1 28 In the 1973 case of De Loraine
v. MEBA Pension Trust, an engineer alleged violations of ADEA. The
court found that a 'trust is not a labor unit, thus this action was not within
the ADEA. More importantly, the court holds that it is not unlawful under
the Act to observe a bona fide pension plan if it is not used as a subterfuge
to evade the Act.' 29  To determine whether a particular plan is a subter-
fuge, the court must consider whether it is uniformly applied. This provision
has also been interpreted to mean that employees not covered by any retire-
ment benefit plan cannot be forced to retire.13 0  Because it is very difficult
to ascertain what is a bona fide seniority system, it appears incongruous for
the Act to protect only those employees not covered by any retirement plan.
Still another exception provides that it is not unlawful to discharge or
discipline an individual for just cause.' 8 ' The Secretary of Labor has inter-
preted this section to require certain criteria that must be uniformly
applied.' 32 The criteria are: 1. physical fitness, 2. evaluation factors, 3. "an
employer's condition as to the number or schedule of hours," and 4. a "poli-
cy against hiring relatives of present employees.' 3 3  Strongfellow v. Mon-
santo Company, a case dealing with this exception, involves employees who
were involuntarily retired when the plant was closed for economic reasons.
Most of the workers eliminated were in the over forty category but no dis-
crimination was found here because the company conducted a complete uni-
form evaluation of the employees' performances. From this evaluation they
retained only the most capable and competent workers. The court decided
125. 354 F. Supp. 230 at 239 (N.D. I1. 1973), rev'd., No. 73-1214 (7th Cir. 1974).
126. GA. BAR. J. supra note 122.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f) (2) (1967).
128. GA. BAR. J., supra note 122.
129. 355 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
130. GA. BAR. J., supra note 122.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f) (3) (1967).
132. BAY. L. REV., supra note 122.
133. GA. BAR. J., supra note 122 at 122.
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that retirement here was based on reasonable factors other than age, thus
there was no violation of the ADEA.1
3 4
In opposition to Strongfellow is the Fifth Circuit opinion Hodgson v.
First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Broward Co., Florida.135
The court did not find that the facts of this case brought it under the just
cause exception. First Federal's personnel manager did not hire anyone
past thirty to be a teller, he was unable to present to the court a clear cut
evaluation plan and it was apparent that there was no reasonable basis for
his refusal to hire older employees. The criteria he used for the evaluation
was unevenly applied. He rejected a woman applicant over forty because
she was too fat, yet he hired a young woman who weighed twenty pounds
more. The court found that one standard for the young and a different
standard for the old would not 'bring it within the just cause exception to
the Act.
The ADEA not only delineates persons protected, but it provides for
educational and research programs concerning the needs and abilities of the
elderly.'8 6 It should be especially noted that there is a specific provision
for the Secretary of Labor to recommend to Congress whether the forty to
sixty-five classification in the Act should be changed.' 3 7 The ADEA pro-
vides that this be done within six months after the Act becomes effective.
Six years later this has not been accomplished. Additionally, a study re-
garding involuntary retirement was to be submitted to the President and
Congress.'38 This also has not been completed, thus those persons the Act
was designed to protect have not been benefited by available research.
2. Procedural Difficulties in ADEA
The enforcement of the ADEA is under the fair labor standards divi-
sion of the Department of Labor. 139 Provisions for damages come within
this section. 140 An evaluation of these provisions will help clarify the effec-
tiveness of the ADEA.
There are many practical problems in litigating cases under the ADEA.
Before any litigation can take place, the informal methods provided for in
134. 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
135. 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1967).
137. Id. at § 622 (b).
138. Id. at § 624.
139. Id. at § 626 (b).
140. Id. The case of Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Co., 335 F. Supp. 321, 234
(N.D. Ga. 1971) has a good discussion of damages under the Act: "The damages
should properly equal the difference between the value of the compensation by way of
salary together with other specific monetary benefits, such as increased pension bene-
fits which would have vested prior to trial, to which plaintiff would be entitled had he
remained employed by defendant until the trial date and the value of his total benefits
and earnings at other jobs from his discharge until the trial date." (Footnote omitted).
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the ADEA must be exhausted. 1 4 1 Brennan v. Ace Hardware, a 1973 deci-
sion, held for the employer despite violations of the ADEA because the con-
ciliation officer did not follow the prescribed regulation of informal admin-
istrative procedure prior to the legal procedure. The court found it was
necessary to make "efforts to obtain voluntary compliance through concilia-
tion, conference, and persuasion."'1 42 To hold for the employer who violated
the ADEA 'because of a procedural defect, seems to blatantly contradict the
main thrust of the ADEA.
Once the informal procedure has been dispensed with, either the Secre-
tary of Labor or a private individual may bring an action. The plaintiff
has a very heavy burden since there must be sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case. 1 43 Seldom will the plaintiff have the amount of evidence
at his disposal as was found in Hodgson v. First Federal, 44 previously men-
tioned. The personnel officer's memorandums presented in court statea
simply that the older woman was "too old." Additionally, there was a 'high
turnover rate for the job of bank teller, although there were thirty-five posi-
tions available in one year, none of the thirty-five were filled by people over
forty. The interviewer told the woman that he did not think she could per-
form the job because of the long hours it was necessary to stand on her
feet. He also placed a request limiting applicants to those within the twenty
to twenty-four year age range with the employment agency.
The court found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case under
the ADEA. This is an unusual case because those incriminating memos
were discovered and placed in evidence. In the normal course of litigation
it would be difficult to obtain such concrete evidence.
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case the burden then shifts
"to the defendant to justify the existence of any disparities" in treatment
between the younger and older applicant. 1 45  The court found there was no
justification for -the personnel officer's refusal to hire older women. Unfor-
tunately, most cases lack this evidence of blatant discrimination.
[T]he applicant can produce little, if any, evidence of why he was
denied employment. For this reason, the ultimate burden of per-
suasion should be placed on the defendant-employer since he is
the only person who can provide an explanation as to why the
applicant was denied employment, for reasons other than his
age.146
141. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (b) (1967).
142. 6 FEP 145, 148 (D. of Neb. 1973).
143. GA. BAR. J., supra note 122; Hodgson v. Earnest Mach. Prods., 479 F.2d 1133(6th Cir. 1973).
144. Hodgson v. First Federal Say. and L. Ass'n, supra note 135.
145. Id. at 822; see also N.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967);
Shultz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., Inc., 5 EPD 8657 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
146. BAY L. REv., supra note 122 at 609.
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The ADEA has been evaluated by the White House Conference on Ag-
ing in 1971147 and the United States Senate Reports of the Special Committee
on Aging.1 48 They have found advancing age to be a formidable obstacle dur-
ing prosperity as well as during recession. Older workers are the first fired in
periods of widespread unemployment and the last to be hired during the
recovery.' 49 The White House Conference questioned whether the Act was
being vigorously enforced and whether further efforts were -needed to secure
the protection of the elderly.
3. Conclusion
The following improvements are necessary in the ADEA:
1. To strengthen the ADEA, the age sixty-five limitation should be
removed because it is arbitrary and can be attacked constitutionally since
it is not based on an individual's ability. 150
2. Although the ADEA calls for forced retirement research, six years
have elapsed and nothing has been accomplished because other programs
have been given priority;' 5 ' therefore, this study should promptly commence.
3. The clause excepting companies with retirement benefit funds as
long as they are not a subterfuge also requires close scrutiny for in many
instances, the older worker loses his job and his pension benefits as well. 152
4. There has been very little litigation under the ADEA and many
times there has been superficial enforcement.' 5 3 The Wage and Hour Divi-
sion of Employment Standards Administration has the jurisdiction for en-
forcement but they have limited time to devote to age discrimination aotivi-
ties because they are charged with administering other labor related stat-
utes.' 5 4 A new enforcement agency may also be necessary to put more
emphasis on age discrimination budgetary requests.
5. Government pronouncements and legislation indicate an official in-
tent to aid the elderly. Its actions do not. The 1972 Special Committee
Report on Aging said:
147. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON RETIREMENT, supra note 21.
148. 1969 Report on Aging, supra note 38; Report on Aging, supra note 22;
Improving ADEA, supra note 56.
149. Report on Aging, supra note 22.
150. See discussion infra.
151. 1969 Report on Aging, supra note 38.
152. Report on Aging, supra note 22.
153. Improving ADEA, supra note 56. According to this 1973 report, the Dept.
of Labor has filed 140 suits. Sixty of these have been settled by either a court decision
or monetary settlement. The Labor Dept.'s biggest victory to date has been the nego-
tiated settlement with Standard Oil of Calif. whereby the Co "agreed to pay 2 million
dollars in back pay to 160 older workers it had fired and to rehire 120 of them."
Newsweek, at 73, Col. 1, (May 27, 1974).
154. Report on Aging, supra note 22.
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[a]dequate funding has also been a major stumbling block for ef-
fective enforcement of the act. The 1967 law authorized $3 mil-
lion for enforcement purposes, but no administration has ever
spent one-half that amount. For fiscal 1974, the Administration's
budget request is $1,451,000.15
Despite the fact that in many instances the state legislation has been
in existence for a longer period than the Federal Act, similar problems con-
front the enforcement of state legislation providing protection for the elderly.
The experiences of these states are important to legislative findings in fur-
ther developing the ADEA.
B. State Anti-Age Discrimination Legislation
Strong state laws, actively administered, curtail discrimination against
the mature worker, -thus allowing the elderly to be considered more frequent-
ly for vacant positions. 156 Unfortunately, states are handicapped by a lack
of funds, a lack of personnel and loopholes within the law itself.
A classic example of an inadequate statute is one without a civil remedy.
In a case interpreting the Massachusetts anti-age bias statute, the court said
the employer's duty not to discharge an employee due to age is statutory.
1 57
Therefore, if there is no civil remedy in the statute, there is no redress
for a violation. Despite public policy condemning age bias, this statute is
ineffective.
The Wisconsin statute states that nothing in the Act can prevent retire-
ment when the retirement policies in the pension agreement are not a subter-
fuge for evasion of the Act's purposes. A case where thirty-eight persons
were forced to retire resulted in a decision for the employer. 158 The court
reasoned that the employees were retired pursuant to a retirement policy
that was within the statutory exception. The evidence necessary to sustain
a court's finding that a pension agreement is a subterfuge are:
either that the retirement benefits payable to the retired employee
were unsubstantial or, if substantial, that continued payment
thereof was likely to be jeopardized. 159
This is a difficult burden to prove, thus limiting the statute's usefulness.
There has been no litigation under the Illinois Statute. 160  This statute
155. Id. at 67. The new amendments providing for funding of 5 million dollars
instead of 3 million is meaningless if there is no enforcement.
156. Improving ADEA, supra note 56.
157. Johnson v. U.S. Steel, 348 Mass. 168, 202 N.E.2d 816 (1964).
158. Walker Mfg. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 27 Wisc. 2d 669, 135 N.W. 2d 307
(1965).
159. Id., 27 Wisc. 2d at 685, 135 N.W. 2d at 316.
160. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 48, § 881 - § 887 (1967). It should be noted that age
discrimination is not included in the F.E.P.C., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 851 et. seq.
(1971).
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has broader coverage than the federal statute as there is no age limitation.
Discrimination against anyone forty-five and over is banned.'16  Nonetheless,
the act is contradictory to its policy and intent as it allows the government
to maintain compulsory retirement policies.' 62
A model statute and program, the Connecticut Statute and the Con-
necticut Commission on Human Rights 'and Opportunities, have shown how
valuable this type of legislation can be to the elderly. Baskin v. University
of Connecticut163 held that the plaintiff, a doctor, was discriminated against
when he was denied a job with the student health center. The court ordered
the University to hire the plaintiff. Since age was the predominant motivat-
ing factor in the denial of the complainant's application for employment, the
defendant's actions were a violation of the statute. In another decision 'the
Commission also found a company policy to be discriminatory because they
did not hire any truck drivers over forty, 164 but hired instead younger men
with less experience. The order of the Commission required the company
to:
1. offer each of the complainants the position desired;
2. pay the complainants the difference between what they have
earned since the filing of the complaint and what they would have
earned had they been given the desired position on that day;
3. cease and desist from discriminating because of age;
4. post in prominent places the employees' rights under the statute.
This state statute accomplishes effectively its intended purpose by eliminat-
ing arbitrary age discrimination.
As can be deduced from the above section, social legislation requires
improvement and increased appropriations are mandatory.' 65  If the statu-
tory coverage is inadequate, it cannot effectuate a proper solution for the
elderly's status. The only alternative remedy is an individual action.
V. THE INDIVIDUAL'S ABILITY TO PROTECT HIMSELF
A. The Constitutional Right
Tremendous reliance has always been placed on litigation for redress
of wrongs, but this remedy alone has not been successful in rapidly achiev-
ing results. Anyone familiar with Plessy cv. Ferguson6 6 and Brown v. Board
161. ILL. REV. STAT., ch 48, § 881 (b) (1967).
162. Id. at § 883.
163. 2 (CCH) EPG 5054 (1971).
164. Williams et al. v. Entenmann's Bakery of Conn., Inc., 3 (CCH) EPG 5114
(1972).
165. Chicago Sun Times, The Fight Against 'Age-ism', Nov. 19, 1973, at 70, col.
3.
166. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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of Education'67 must realize that it took fifty-eight years to reject the separate
but equal doctrine in race discrimination. The protective attitude toward
women, which results in sex discrimination embodied in the 1908 case of
Muller v. Oregon,168 has not yet been rejected by the courts. Thus legisla-1
tion, litigation and mass re-education are the weapons necessary to fight for
the rights of the elderly. Litigation is a valuable means for re-educating
the public and for securing small victories against age discrimination. These
small victories are the building blocks upon which further litigation and legis-
lation are built.
To preserve the livelihood of competent employees, cases constitution-
ally attacking mandatory retirement statutes are currently being litigated. 169
The same arguments presented against the mandatory retirement statutes are
also applicable against the ADEA. 170  The ADEA can 'be constitutionally
attacked on two levels. The age classification of forty to sixty-five is an
arbitrary classification not based on facts which irrebutably presumes that
all people over sixty-five are incompetent and the Statute infringes upon the
individual's right to work. The provision for a mandatory retirement study
which was written into the Act itself reveals legislative concern for the rea-
sonableness of mandatory retirement.' 17  Thus whether an individual attacks
compulsory retirement statutes or the ADEA itself, another viable remedy
for procuring economic security is thereby afforded to the elderly. Under-
standing the arguments on both sides of -this issue will elucidate its value
to the elderly plaintiff.
In the 1974 case of Weisbrod v. Lynn a seventy year old attorney em-
ployed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development was retired
from his position in compliance with a mandatory retirement statute. At-
tacking the constitutionality of this compulsory retirement provision is the
remedy utilized by Mr. Weisbrod since his age places him beyond the limited
protection of the ADEA. This plaintiff sought to have a three judge court
convene to examine the issues but the District Court for the District of
Columbia denied the motion and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate
Court reversed stating that the constitutional issues presented are "of suffi.
cient substance as to warrant consideration by a three judge court."' 72  In
167. 374 U.S. 483 (1954).
168. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
169. Weisbrod v. Lynn, No. 73-1146 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 11, 1974); Chicago Daily
News, Apr. 3, 1974, at 4, col. 6. The A.M.A. has joined the plaintiff in this suit in an
attempt to overturn mandatory retirement of Civil Service employees. Chicago Daily
News, May 18, 1974, at 16, col. 6.
170. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967).
171. Id. at § 625. The act also provides for a research and education program per-
taining to the desirability of changing the lower or upper age limits set forth in the Act
at § 622 (b). Although this was to be accomplished within 6 months after the passage
of the Act, it still has not been accomplished.
172. Weisbrod, supra note 169 at 3.
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light of this court's decision and increased litigation in this area, an analysis
of the individual's arguments against mandatory retirement provisions is
necessary.
1. The Individual's Arguments
The equal protection clause permits classifications that have a reason-
able basis in fact. The test traditionally used is that -the classification must
have a rational purpose which is reasonably related to a legitimate objec-
tive. 178 The legislative conclusion that certain common characteristics bind
the aged into a designated class cannot provide a rational basis for the classi-
fication because of available data which discredits age as a determination
of capability. An even stronger case against mandatory retirement can be
developed if the plaintiff brings himself within the more stringent test of in-
terference with a fundamental right to work or an inherently suspect classifi-
cation of invidious discrimination. 174
Mandatory retirement legislation abridges an individual's fundamental
right to work implicit within the due process clause of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.' 7 5 Furthermore, the requisite compelling governmental
interest required to justify interference with that fundamental right is lack-
ing.'7 6
The original discussion regarding a fundamental -right to work began
with the 1914 Supreme Court case of Smith v. Texas which found that
[i]nsofar as a man is deprived of the right to labor his liberty
is restricted, his capacity to earn wages and acquire property is
lessened, and he is denied the protection which the law affords
to those who are permitted to work. Liberty means more than
freedom from servitude, and the constitutional guarantee is an
assurance that the citizen shall be protected in the right to use his
powers of mind and body in any lawful calling.'
77
The following year another Supreme Court case, Truax v. Raich, declared
that
[i]t requires no argument to show that the right to work for a
living in the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the [fourteenth] Amendment to secure. 1 78
Years later in his concurring opinion in United States v. Robel, Mr. Justice
Brennan similarly perceived that an individual has a fifth amendment right
to employment that is protected against any unreasonable governmental in-
173. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSITUTIONAL LAW, § 153 (1972).
174. Id. at 154.
175. U.S. CONST. amends. and XIV, § 1.
176. SCHWARTZ, supra note 174.
177. 233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914).
178. 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
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terference. 1 79  The fifth amendment in stating that "[n]o person shall be
. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property"18 0 must implicitly protect the abil-
ity to acquire property. Without employment, economic security cannot be
achieved; consequently, the fifth amendment protection of life, liberty and
property must include the ability to maintain employment and earn a liveli-
hood to support one's fundamental needs.
Mandatory retirement provisions may be attacked because there is a
denial of equal protection under the law since age classification is arbitrary
and invidious discrimination.' 8 ' These statutes foster an inherently unrea-
sonable classification which is repugnant to the equal protection clause.
Classifications based solely on age are invidious because they unreasonably
curtail the older persons opportunity to find and keep employment. Recent
statistical and legislative materials indicate that grouping all elderly into one
classification is capricious because it is based on stereotyped notions of dis-
ability.18 2  The arbitrary classification of the aged into one group does not
recognize the vast individual differences existing among the elderly. This
unjustifiably categorizes people without regard for their individual perform-
ance and ability to contribute to society.
Analogies between age discrimination in employment and sex discrimi-
nation in employment can also be drawn.'8 3 Exclusion of individuals based
on physical characteristics over which there is no control has been held to
be unconstitutional because sterotyped ideas of an individual's capability can
not provide the proper basis for job classifications.' 8 4  Maintaining a pre-
sumption as to a person's ability "works an injustice on those whose natural
attributes do not conform to the employer's prejudice."' 85
The Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois declares that these irrebutable
presumptions are constitutionally infirm. The Court holds that unmarried
fathers may not be irrebutably presumed to be incapable of caring for their
children, since
179. 389 U.S. 258, 270 (1967) (concurring opinion).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
181. Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd without opinion, Nos.
71-1398, 71-1852 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3392 (Jan. 8, 1973); see
also Brief for Appellant, Weisbrod supra note 13; Retail Clerks U., Local 770 v. Retail
Clerks Int. Ass'n., 359 F. Supp. 1285 (C.D. Calif. 1973); Fabio v. City of St. Paul,
267 Minn. 273, 126 N.W.2d 259 (1964); Armstrong v. Howell, Civ. 72-0-510 (D. of
Neb., 1974) (memorandum opinion); Gault v. Garrison, No. 74C 931 (N.D.E.D. Ill.
Apr. 1974), (memo in support of preliminary injunction); Murgia v. Mass. No. 72-
2083-T at 2 (D. Mass. May 31, 1974), (3 Judge District Court holds "[c]lassification
based on age alone has no rational basis in furthering any substantial state interest.").
182. Discussion infra.
183. Brief for Appellant Weisbrod, supra note 13.
184. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Weaks v. So. Bell
Tel. and Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); and Ridinger v. Gen. Motors Cor.,
325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1971).
185. Note, Sexual Mythology and Employment Discrimination, 3 SET. HALL. L. REV.
108, 125 (1971).
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as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hear-
ing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from
him and that by denying him a hearing. the State denied Stan-
ley the equal protection of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 186
Irrebuttable presumptions without allowing for individualized deter-
minations have been further rejected in the 1974 Supreme Court case of
Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur. Here the Court holds invalid
a mandatory retirement provision aimed at pregnant school teachers because
it is contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
explaining their position, the Court said:
[t]he provisions amount to a conclusive presumption that every
pregnant teacher who reaches the fifth or sixth month of preg-
nancy is physically incapable of continuing. There is no indi-
vidualized determination by the teacher's doctor-or the school
board's-as to any particular teacher's ability to continue at her
job. The rules contain an irrebutable presumption of physical in-
competency, and that presumption applies even when the medical
evidence as to an individual woman's physical status might be
wholly to the contrary.18 7
Although differing on many points, medical experts agreed that "the
ability of any particular pregnant woman to continue at work past any fixed
time in her pregnancy is very much an individual matter."'1 88  (Footnote
omitted). An overwhelming amount of medical testimony concluded that
most teachers are quite capable of fulfilling their responsibilities beyond the
arbitrary time fixed by the regulation.' 89 In La Fleur the Court recognizes
that scientific data justifies individual determinations while arbitrary classi-
fications without any factual basis do not.
Reed v. Reed, a 1971 Supreme Court decision, absolutely rejected pref-
erential treatment based on a feature over which an individual has no con-
trol. Striking down a mandatory provision in the Idaho Probate Code that
gave preference to men over women for appointment as administrators of
a decedent's estate, the Court said that this arbitrary preference in favor of
males contravened the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Although the Court recognizes that the equal protection clause does not deny
the "[s]tates the power to treat different classes of persons in different
ways" 190 the equal protection clause does
deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be
accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on
the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that stat-
186. 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
187. 94 S. Ct. 791, 798 (1974).
188. Id. at 799.
189. Id. at 803 (concurring opinion).
190. 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
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ute. A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to 'the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' (Citation omit-
ted) .191
The Court here adopted a more rigorous standard for determining what
constitutes a rational relationship. 192  This view does not allow for blanket
assumptions that are unsupported by any scientific evidence. Mandatory
retirement provisions create arbitrary classifications that are unreasonable
and they do not achieve the legislative objective of retaining only competent
employees. Instead incompetents under sixty-five retain -their positions
while competent employees over sixty-five are terminated.
The 1973 Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson goes one step fur-
ther than the Reed criteria of reasonableness when it states that regulations
discriminating against servicewomen by not allowing a quarters allowance
and medical and dental benefits for their spouses, as was allowed for the
spouses of servicemen, cannot prevail. This practice was held to be a viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Mr. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Douglas, White and Marshall conclude
that classifications based upon sex, like classifications 'based upon
race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect and must
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Applying the
analysis mandated by that stricter standard of review, it is clear that
the statutory scheme now before us is constitutionally invalid'
Although the stereotyped notions of women's capabilities were legally pre-
served for years, recent changes in society and the accompanying changes
in the law indicate that these myths can no longer be preserved.
Embedded notions of agism are similar to sex discrimination because
they totally ignore individual ditfferences by categorically classifying all
elderly as incompetent after a specified age. This presumption of senility
is not based upon facts and is not the result of a fitness hearing. 94
The American Civil liberties Union has recently established an elderly
rights project in order to champion the older person's cause and to provide
a viable remedy to combat mandatory retirement statutes. Their position
regarding age discrimination in employment is "that age should be viewed
as a suspect classification, similar to race, color, sex, religion or national
origin. The test for employment should be the ability of the individual to
perform the particular job function."'195  The official litigation position is
that
191. Id.
192. Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1973).
193. 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
194. Stanley, supra note 186.
195. Interviews with Howard Eglit, Legal Director of the ACLU in Chicago, Illi-
nois, Feb. 18, 1974, Mar. 12, 1974, Apr. 2, 1974.
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[m]andatory retirement solely on the basis of age-without any
consideration of the abilities of the individual-simply runs con-
trary to the Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection. If the point of mandatory retirement laws is to ensure
,that teachers are competent, we would do better to test each of
them individually throughout their careers, rather than just arbi-
'trarily tossing out all 65 and over competent educators, whether
they are competent or not. 196
2. Arguments Justifying Mandatory Retirement
Although the above arguments have been advanced on 'behalf of the
elderly, the contrary arguments cannot be ignored. The government's re-
buttal in Weisbrod exemplifies the oppositions' contentions in mandatory re-
tirement suits. It is claimed by the government that
[t]he right to work posited here by plaintiff, like the right to edu-
cation involved in Rodriguez, is simply not among the rights af-
forded explicit or implicit protection by the Constitution, and no
court has indicated to the contrary. Moreover, as we also demon-
strate, age classifications are not 'suspect classifications' for pur-
poses of constitutional ajudication. 197
A right to work has not been conclusively adjudicated to be fundamental.
Those few cases that 'have considered the issue have referred to the right
to work as being fundamental in dicta only. For example, in Truax an in-
vidious discrimination was found when a state law limited the number of
aliens who could be hired by the state.198 Hence an elderly plaintiffs' asser-
tion that the right to work is fundamental is subject to criticism.
The requirement of close scrutiny of mandatory retirement statutes has
been disputed by defendants who contend that an age classification is not
suspect as invidious discrimination.' 99  In Weiss v. Walsh, a Now York Fed-
eral District Court case dealing with this problem, a seventy year old meta-
physician was denied employment at Fordham University despite his out-
standing qualifications due to his age. The court found that
a classification that cuts fully across racial, religious, and economic
lines, and one that generally bears some relation to mental and
physical capacity, age is less likely to be an invidious distinction.
. . . Notwithstanding great advances in gerontology, the era when
advanced age ceases to bear some reasonable statistical relation-
ship to diminished capacity or longevity is still future. It cannot
be said, therefore, that age ceilings upon eligibility for employment
196. Press release of Ruth Adams, Executive Director of the ACLU in Chicago,
Illinois, Apr. 11, 1974.
197. Brief for the Appellees, Weisbrod v. Lynn, No. 73-1146 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
198. Truax, supra note 178.
199. But see Mcilvanie 6 Pa. Cmnwth., supra note 124 (concurring opinion).
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are inherently suspect, although their application will inevitably
fall unjustly in the individual dase.200
A California Federal District Court in 1973 relied on the Weiss decision
to declare that mandatory retirement by-laws adopted by a union were per-
missible because they accomplished a rational objective and age classifica-
tion is not constitutionally infirm.201
Thus without a fundamental right or an invidious discrimination, the
higher standard of a compelling state interest is not required. If a legitimate
governmental purpose is rationally furthered, the classification is constitu-
tionally permissible. Congress is deemed to have a legitimate purpose in
creating these mandatory retirement regulations. These rules are effectu-
ated by Congress to protect the efficiency and the economy of the civil serv-
ice system; therefore, the stringent standards suggested by the individual
fighting mandatory retirement statutes do not 'apply. But arguments of ad-
ministrative convenience and economy in reducing the federal payroll are
constitutionally infirm. Although -the government can legitimately limit its
expenditures for any purpose, invidious distinctions between classes of
citizens are prohibited. 202
It must be noted that both of the above cases203 involved respectively
a private university and a union, thus the requisite state action necessary
for constitutional protection was lacking. Therefore, these cases are easily
distinguishable from cases involving government employees where state ac-
tion is present.
Despite federal and local governments numerous declarations as to their
anti-age bias policies, the government may be the leading offender in prac-
ticing discrimination based on age. In 1968 a group of air force officers
tried to recover the difference between active duty pay and what they would
have received if -they had not been forced to retire early under a statutory
provision. The statute's purpose was found to allow for the retention and
promotion of the most qualified officers. Consequently, the officers' retire-
ment 'was held not to be arbitrary since it was supported by substantial evi-
dence affirming the reasonableness of the forced retirement requirement for
these individuals. Moreover, the court found no deprivation of a vested
property right without due process of law because there is no vested right
in federal employment. 20 4
This case can be distinguished from cases concerning civil service
workers, lawyers, doctors and teachers because, arguably, a greater degree
of physical fitness may be required for adequate performance in the armed
200. Weiss, supra note 181 at 77.
201. Retail Clerks, supra note 181.
202. ScHwARTZ, supra note 173.
203. Weiss and Retail Clerks, supra note 181.
204. Norman v. U.S., 392 F.2d 255 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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services. However, the Greyhound standard of functional capacity rather
than chronological age has been suggested for determining whether a person
can safely perform on the job. Physical capability determinations should
be made throughout a career rather than -at an arbitrary age. Despite the
Seventh Circuit Appellate Court's reversal of this landmark decision, the
Labor Department may appeal the case. Restitution of the elderly's rights
can only be obtained by fighting for judicial cognizance of scientific data
which substantiates that mature individuals' abilities are as diverse as may
be found in any age group. This diversity must be recognized.
A 1974 memorandum opinion of the Nebraska District Court upholds
a mandatory retirement provision in civil service employment. 205 The court
found that an age classification has a reasonable relation to the law in ques-
tion -because age has a definite -relationship with ability to perform on the
job. This decision does not consider the functional capabilities of the in-
dividual, but rather finds the purpose of forced retirement is to induce older
workers to retire when -their skills diminish in order to maintain efficiency
and economy in civil service positions. But they assume that all older
workers skills automatically diminish at sixty4ive. This case also refutes
the plaintiff's contention that she was entitled to 'a fitness hearing before
she was forced to retire. "It is only where a possible collision with a con-
stitutionally protected right or privilege is involved that there should be ex-
tended the right of a termination hearing. ' 206  It is to be noted that the
judiciary's acceptance of the mandatory retirement provisions do not take
cognizance of current studies that show the vast differences and capabilities
of the elderly individual.
3. Conclusion
To date, no plaintiff has won a suit based on age discrimination against
the governement. Perhaps heightened interest in litigating these suits plus
increased awareness of the inequities involved in age discrimination are op-
erating to cause a change. The recent Weisbrod decision allowing for a
three judge court because of substantial constitutional issues coupled with
the Supreme Court's reasoning in La Fleur indicate that these mandatory
retirement statutes are ripe for legal attack.
As a result of the majority's opinion in La Fleur, Justice Rehnquist in
his dissent forecasts the possible striking down of mandatory retirement pro-
visions affecting government employees. After discussing the right to work
as established in the Truax case, he said:
[s]ince this right to pursue an occupation is presumably on the
same lofty footing as the right of choice in matters of family life,
the Court will have to strain valiantly in order to 'avoid having
205. Armstrong v. Howell, supra note 181.
206. Id. at 10.
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today's opinion lead to the invalidation of mandatory retirement
statutes for governmental employees. 20 7
Because compulsory retirement creates an irrebutable presumption not
based on ability or recognition of individual differences, increased litigation
is a means of refuting these presumptions and providing an opportunity to
set precedent in favor of the mature worker. Recent Supreme Court decisi-
sions that have rejected arbitrary classifications in sex discrimination cases
may be setting a trend toward protecting the mature, capable workers' em-
ployment positions.
B. The Tort Right
If the constitutional approach is unsuccessful, another avenue that
might be investigated is a tort action. A tort arises whenever there is inter-
ference with an individual's rights. If there is a right to work,20 8 there may
be an action in tort for preventing employment through forced retirement.
Dean Prosser said that where there are interferences that "invade a
right which is entitled to protection, . . . an action may lie for them
.... "209 Additionally, since "[c]ivil rights statutes have been held to afford
a cause of action, '2 10 a tort action may thus arise for the infringement of
an individual's opportunity to maintain 'gainful employment. This possible
remedy can only occur once a right to work has been firmly established.
An analysis of what the individual can do to protect their employment
status has been presented. Social legislation and labor organizations ability
to assist the elderly has been evaluated. What else can be done to help
the elderly?
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Widespread experimentaion should be encouraged to adjust career pat-
terns to individual needs and desires. This should include:
1. sabbaticals before retirement;
2. the encouragement of part-time work;
3. trial retirement;
4. gradual retirement;211 and
5. the development of a separate govermnental department that
would deal only with the problems of the elderly would better pro-
tect the mature individual.
207. LaFleur, supra note 187 at 806 (dissenting opinion).
208. Truax, supra note 178.
209. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) at 42.
210. Id. at n.42.
211. Developments in Aging, 1968, A Report of the Special Committee on Aging,
U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st sess., at 113.
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The United States Special Committee on Aging made additional valu-
able recommendations in March, 1973. They called for:
[e]stablishment of "National Employ ,the Older Worker Week"
on a permanent basis to educate the public about the true cap-
abilities of persons in their 40's, 50's, and above.
Full funding for the Older American Community Service Employ-
ment Act. Early enactment of the Middle-Aged and Older
Workers Training Act.
Encouragement of job redesign in government and industry to
provide greater freedom of choice to older workers who want or
need to work.
Private pension reforms, including provisions for vesting, minimum
funding requirements, reinsurance, fiduciary standards, and other
essential improvements. 212
This Committee's recommendations to extend ADEA coverage to govern-
ment employees, to broaden the law to include employers with twenty rather
than twenty-five employees and to increase the three million dollar author-
ization to five million have already been accomplished.2 13
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to systematically assess the remedies avail-
able to the mature worker for the protection of his employment and income.
Legislation has been ineffective. Union protection must be expanded. In-
dividual recourse is just beginning. However, improvement in any of these
areas will only be possible after a massive re-education program. Myths
associating the aged with blanket senility must be disspelled and factual
material relating to the capabilities of the mature worker must be recog-
nized. Stereotypes which operate to relegate all elderly to an inferior status
must be discredited as older persons possess as numerous individual differ-
ences as do younger persons. As is true in any class, the elderly do not
all 'have the same characteristics. There is as much diversity in this age
group as can be found in any age group. Many persons perform competent-
ly, consistently and conscienciously past their sixty-fifth or seventieth birth-
day. Useful today, useless tomorrow is a theme that should haunt us all.
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